

A Heidegger Seminar on Hegel's Differenzschrift¹

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
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In March of 1958, Heidegger delivered the lecture "Hegel and the Greeks" at the University of Aix-en-Provence. At the invitation of his friend the poet René Char, he returned three times to Provence in either late August or early September of 1966, 1968, and 1969, to conduct seminars in the little town of Le Thor for select groups of French philosophers and graduate students. Jean Beaufret and François Fedier were among the principal participants. Each year the seminar sessions were held on successive days extending over approximately a week. There was to have been a fourth seminar in France in 1973, but for reasons of health Heidegger held it in his home in Zähringen just outside Freiburg. It lasted only three days.

No arrangements were made to transcribe the seminar of 1966. This may have been due to the fact that only five men other than Heidegger himself participated in it. Notes taken at the time were later assembled, so that we do have some record of three of the sessions devoted to Heraclitus. Very accurate transcripts were made of all the sessions of the remaining seminars. For the two Thor seminars of 1968 and 1969 various seminar participants took turns writing the "Protokolls" of the daily sessions. These records or summaries of the proceedings were published soon afterward in limited offset editions, and for a number of years they were circulated among participants and their friends. They were later revised only slightly by the editors of *Questions IV**. The transcripts of the Zähringen sessions are more polished and more unitary than those for the Thor seminars. They resemble in form and style the "Summary of a Seminar on the lecture 'Time and Being'" and seem to have been intended for the first for a wider publication. (In *On Time and Being* [Tr. Joan Stambaugh], New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 25–54.)

All four of the seminars had the same theme in the sense that they all attempted simply to approach the question of Being. They took as the point of departure and vehicle of their quest texts from Heraclitus and Parmenides in 1966, from Hegel in 1968, from Kant in 1969, and from Husserl in 1973.

*Martin Heidegger, *Questions IV*, Paris: Gallimard, 1976. (Traduit de L'Allemand par Jean Beaufret, François Fedier, Jean Lanyerois et Claude Roëls.)

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The 1968 seminar, the transcription of which is translated here, follows the theme of tornness in Hegel's early dialectic along a path that it is hoped may lead to the place where "the two terms of the opposition separating the fundamental experience of metaphysics from the question concerning the meaning of Being" will appear in their full reality. On the way to this goal topic after topic is taken up, seemingly rather randomly, but each is intended as one part of the preparation for an experience of the ontological difference.

These summaries are notable not only for the immediacy with which they picture to us thinkers questing after Being, but also for their lively portrayal of Heidegger in his role as teacher, now leading a probing investigation into the full range of meaning in such words as 'unity', 'infinity', and *Aufhebung*, now revealing a sense of humor as he engages professional philosophers in a "kindergarten exercise in phenomenology."

Summary of the Session of August 30

This session is the first in the seminar. Heidegger begins, therefore, with a general remark concerning the work in a seminar. There can be no one in authority over it, since we are doing the work together in common. We are working in order to arrive at the *Sache selbst* [matter itself]² which is in question. Accordingly, the authority is the matter itself. In our contact with the text to be studied, it is a question of meeting—and being met by—the matter itself. Hence the text is only a means and not an end.

In our case, we shall be concerned with Hegel. We must, therefore, enter into a discussion with Hegel, so that he may speak to us. We must let him speak himself, and not embroider what he has to say with our own knowledge. In this way and only in this way can we resist the danger of personal interpretation.

That is why, in a true seminar, the teacher is the one who learns the most. For this reason he must not teach the others what the text is; he must listen to what it says.

The law of the seminar is to question unceasingly. Pupils should support the questions of the teacher through their questions. Never *believe* anything; everything needs to be tested. Thus we see that work is not to be measured in terms of quantity.

Heidegger recalls that at Marburg his manner of working elicited mistrust. At first the students said that in a whole semester they had not even gotten out of Plato's *Sophist* In our seminar, Heidegger continues, we cannot be sure of getting beyond a few lines of the text. But one thing is sure, and that is that if we get these lines, we will then be able to read Hegel's whole book. That, he says, is *das Geheimnis*³ *des Seminars* [the secret of the seminar].

Next he proceeds to a quick description of the atmosphere at the time of the birth of the *Differenzschrift*. This occurred during Hegel's Frankfort period (Hegel stayed in Frankfort until January, 1799). Hölderlin was then nearby, at Bad Homburg, and the two friends saw each other. This proximity poses a question, however. For at this time the poet, despite all the appearances of dialectic that his *Essays* may present, has already passed through and shattered speculative idealism—while Hegel is in the process of constituting it. This, Heidegger observes, could be a question for the next few days.

What is the occasion of this work? It is the appearance of a book⁴ by Reinhold, a contemporary. Reinhold was born at Vienna and studied with the Jesuits. He moved on to philosophy and came to have Protestant leanings. He was a cheerful and courageous man. When Reinhold is appointed to Kiel, Fichte succeeds to his chair. Hegel is much too severe with him.

Shortly after the book's appearance, September 3, 1801, Schelling writes to Fichte: "In these very days a book has appeared which is the product of an extremely good mind"

Having thus sketched the outward circumstances, we have now to "leap right into the matter itself." To facilitate this Heidegger starts with a note of Hegel's, "Better a torn sock than a mended sock . . . ," and asks why this is so. A moment of hesitation follows, since the listeners know another version of this same sentence. Heidegger explains that the sentence as it has just been cited was corrected by the printer to become the one that we know.⁵ Let us return then to Hegel's notation and ask ourselves how he could have written it. For clearly the contrary is what seems rather to be true. From a merely formal standpoint, then, we could already say that common sense has been turned upside down and made to stand on its head.

In order to understand, we must see phenomenologically, Heidegger says. He now invites us to the first kindergarten exercise in phenomenology. To tear, *zer-reissen*, is to rend in two, to break = to make two. In the case of a torn sock, the sock is that which is no longer there—but careful! not as sock *per se*. Actually, when I have the sock on my foot "in good condition," it is precisely then that I do not view it as a sock. Whereas if the sock becomes torn, then *THE* sock shows through the "sock torn to pieces" with great force.

In other words, what is lacking in the torn sock is the *UNITY* of the sock. But this lack, paradoxically, is positive to the highest degree; for this unity is *present* in the tear as a *lost* unity. It is from here that we begin in approaching Hegel's text—not without Heidegger's

insistence that the "analysis" to be carried out must be "nachvollzogen" ["realized" in Cezanne's sense], and not simply reduced to concepts.

P. 12, 1. 6ff. "*Entzweiung* (italicized by Hegel), severing, is the source of the *need for philosophy*." In order to underscore the fact that Hegel begins with the tear as that which is both primarily experienceable and primarily experienced, this sentence is placed in juxtaposition to the sentence on page 13, line 30ff: "The opposites which previously were meaningful under the form of spirit and matter, soul and body, belief and understanding, freedom and necessity, etc. . . . and under many other modes in still more restricted spheres . . ." up to the passing over into the radical opposition of "absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity."⁶

Negatively stated, what this sentence says is that all attempts to suppress *Zerrissenheit* [tornness] must be abandoned—in as much as *Zerrissenheit* is that which at bottom remains and ought to remain. Why? The answer is that only in *Zerrissenheit* can unity appear as absent, as we have seen above. "In tornness," the Professor formulates, "unity or necessary reunion, i. e., *living unity*, always rules."⁷

With this central idea of *lebendige Einheit* [living unity] we are able to read the sentence on page 14, line 9, which Heidegger says dominates the whole. "When the power of union"⁸

This sentence is a commentary on page 12 on severing as the source of the need of philosophy. Accordingly we observe concerning it:

1. That *Ent-zweiung* [severing] is really in the movement of the *Ent-*, i.e., a departure or something which *leaves* something else. *Entzweiung*, then, is two which *separate* from one another into two.

2. That this *Ent-zweiung* takes place through a lack of *Vereinigung* [union].

In this connection, an observation is made concerning the translation of *Vereinigung*. "Unification" is not right. How is it to be understood, then? First by noting that *die Macht der Vereinigung* [the power of union] is, as unfolded, a characteristic of the Absolute. In this connection Heidegger reminds us that from the beginning thought thinks in the dimension of *unity*.

He asks why this should be so. This question will be taken up again later.

We return now to *Vereinigung* to point out its difference from unification. In *Vereinigung*, even though it is a work of the Absolute, the oppositions *do not disappear*. There is unity of opposites which

remain as opposites. But what, then, is this *Vereinigung*? It is the power that maintains the opposites *for each other*; in this maintaining, what does not arise is the autonomy or separateness of the opposites from each other, each one for itself (which is characteristic of *Ent-zweiung*).

This enables us to read the preceding sentence (p. 14, line 12ff.) where the idea of *notwendige Entzweiung* [necessary severing] appears. Indeed, *Entzweiung* is necessary if every positing is necessarily a counter-positing, and thus a producing of duality.

On the basis of a comparison of these two sentences, we enter the thought of Hegel: Everything works itself out in the opposition between activity which is thetic and consequently also anti-thetic and a power which is capable of maintaining the unity of the two—thanks to the *positing* of unity, which, in its turn, engenders the opposite, which must also be *vereinigt* [brought into union], and so forth

But is it a matter of an "and so forth"? Here appears the last theme touched upon today: that of *infinity*.

It is to be understood that "infinite" can mean: "to infinity," in other words, the "without end" of the finite. But then we have what Hegel calls bad infinity. Opposed to this is good infinity, in which infinite means: in-finite [*un-endlich*], i.e., *Aufhebung des Endlichen* [lifting up and dissolving of the finite]. Good infinity is the one in which we *relinquish* the finite. Such infinity is no longer the absence of any limit, but it is the *Macht der Vereinigung* [power of union] itself.

Summary of the Session of August 31

Heidegger reminds us first of the meaning of Hegel's sentence, "Better a torn sock than a mended sock." But afterwards he says, "For self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*),⁹ this is not so."

To understand this last sentence, we must remember the double meaning of the word *Selbstbewusstsein* in Hegel. The word designates, on the one hand, ordinary consciousness in its non-thematical relationship to objects, and, on the other, the problem of the *ego cogito* as it has been at the center of modern thought since Descartes. What Hegel means is that ordinary consciousness does not think that a torn sock is worth more than a mended sock. Nevertheless, if we understand *Selbstbewusstsein* in the sense of reflective-dialectical thought, we must understand that reflective-dialectical thought gathers together into a higher unity both common-sense thinking and the truth of this thought (its philosophical thematization).

Two questions are then asked:

I. If *Entzweiung* (severing, splitting, rending in two) is the source of the need of philosophy, if philosophy appears as the solution when life has become that which tears to pieces, *what is the dynamic of Entzweiung?*

II. If philosophy is not a piecing together, and if tearing is necessary, *can we speak of a unity before the tearing?*

For the answer to the second question, Professor Heidegger refers us to the first chapter of Aristotle's *Physics*. Anyone who wishes to enter philosophy must pass through this book, which can replace entire libraries of philosophical works.

The answer to the first question is made easier by a reference to the sentence in Hegel that refers severing to its simplest and most essential example, the relation between subject and object: "The oppositions which previously were important in the form of spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and understanding, freedom and necessity, etc., and under many other modes in still more restricted spheres, and which attached to themselves all the weight of human interest, have with the progress of civilization passed over into the form of the opposites of reason and sensuality, intelligence and nature, or, for the universal concept, into the form of the opposites of *absolute subjectivity* and *absolute objectivity*."¹⁰ (The italics are ours).

How do we arrive at this separation, at this severing of subject from object? How does the one break its way through in relation to the other? This question presupposes an antecedent stage in which the severing had not yet taken place. This antecedent stage is, for Hegel, the Greek world.

What, then, is the dynamic moment of the subject-object severing? It is the quest for absolute certainty. This quest, which is born of the interpretation of truth as certainty makes its appearance historically with the first *Meditation* of Descartes. With Descartes, man as *ego cogito* becomes the foremost *hypokeimenon*, the *subiectum* (in the medieval sense)—the *fundamentum inconcussum*. At the same time nature appears only as the Object for the Subject.

It can be shown that, as a historical prelude to this event, the quest for certainty appears first in the realm of faith, as the quest for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the realm of physics as the quest for *mathematical* certainty in nature (Galileo)—a quest prepared long ago on the ground of language by the nominalist separation of words from things (William of Occam). The Occamite formalism, in emptying the concept of its reality, renders possible

the idea of a mathematical key to the world. From whence the question arises: Is it possible to grasp in one concept, in one necessity, the unity of both mathematical certainty and the certainty of salvation?

Heidegger's answer is that it is the *assurance* (controllability, disposability, security) sought after in both instances that gathers together these two apparently independent things. What is aimed at in the mathematical quest for certainty is man's assurance concerning nature or the *sensory*; what is aimed at in the quest for the certainty of salvation is man's assurance concerning the *suprasensory* world.

Thus the origin of severing is the transformation of truth into certainty. To this corresponds the priority given to human-being in the sense of *ego cogito*, i.e., its advent into the rank of *subject*. From this time onward nature becomes object (*obiectum*), object being nothing other than "that which is projected toward me" (*das mir Entgegenworfene*). When the *ego* becomes the absolute *subiectum*, everything else becomes *obiectum* for it, under the form of perception for example. (Such is the starting point for the Kantian *Gegenstand* [object]). The important thing is that the subject-object distinction is operative entirely in the dimension of subjectivity. This dimension is characterized in Hegel by the expression *Bewusstsein* [consciousness]. "Consciousness" is the sphere of subjectivity. Consciousness, i.e., *Bewusstsein* as *alles Zusammensehen* [seeing everything together], *co-agere*. In the text being studied all Hegel's essential terms are related to the *Bewusstsein*.

The paragraphs devoted to Descartes in *Sein und Zeit* [*Being and Time*] constitute the first attempt to leave the prison of the *Bewusstsein*, or rather, not to return to it again. It is not at all a matter of reestablishing realism as over against idealism; for realism, in restricting itself to providing assurance that a world exists for the subject, remains indebted to Cartesianism. It is a matter, rather, of succeeding in thinking the *Greek* meaning of *ego*.

Returning from *Bewusstsein* to *Entzweiung*, Heidegger again quotes the sentence of Hegel: "When the power of union disappears from the life of men, and the opposites, having lost their living relationship and their reciprocal action, have won their autonomy, the need of philosophy arises."¹¹

Two words here require clarification: *Bedürfnis* and *Philosophie*. What does the phrase, *Bedürfnis der Philosophie* [need of philosophy]. mean? We are confronted grammatically with a genitive. This genitive is ordinarily understood as an objective genitive: When the

power of union disappears from the life of men, the latter experience the need to philosophize. But what does "need" mean? The word has a negative meaning. To have need of something is simultaneously to experience the absence, the lack, and the necessity of this thing; it is to be "in want," to be in distress [*Not*] in regard to something. But the word also has a positive meaning: To have need of something is to start on the way toward something, to trouble oneself, to take pains in order to procure it for oneself (*sich um etwas bemühen*).

Must we understand, then, that something is in need of philosophy, or, on the contrary, might it be philosophy which has need of something? Is it a matter of a subjective genitive or an objective genitive? It is a matter of a *subjective genitive*, Heidegger says. Hegel wants to show what philosophy needs in order to be a true philosophy.

What does philosophy have need of? Since its birth, since the *hen panta* of Heraclitus and the *hen* of Parmenides, philosophy has thought not mere multiplicity, but multiplicity in so far as it is gathered together. Philosophy has need of the *hen*. This is why philosophy can and must supply the power of union (*Macht der Vereinigung*). In the phrase *Bedürfnis der Philosophie*, the genitive is, then, *subjective and objective at the same time*. Only if we understand what philosophy has need of—total and absolute unity—only then do we understand why there appears the need of philosophy.

There is need for unity because unity is never immediately given; otherwise everything would be engulfed in "the (Schellingian) night in which all cows are black." Unity reestablishes itself constantly at the heart of the greatest severing. This is why Hegel writes: ". . . necessary severing is a factor of life which eternally shapes itself in opposing, and the totality is possible in its greatest vitality only through reinstatement out of the greatest separation."¹²

Having established this, Heidegger reminds us of the Hegelian meaning of the word *Wissenschaft* [science]. Hegel employs the word in the Fichtean sense. The "System of Science," which is constituted by the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* taken together, is a system of philosophy. *Wissenschaft* is the name for philosophy which has become absolute knowledge, knowledge on the part of the subject that knows itself as *fundamentum inconcussum*.

It will occur to Husserl to hesitate between the ordinary meaning of the word *Wissenschaft* and its Hegelian meaning, as may be seen in *Krisis*.

Heidegger now poses several questions. If the need of philosophy

is what philosophy has need of in order to be philosophy, what is philosophy? Its essence has been glimpsed through calling to mind the *hen* of Heraclitus and Parmenides: philosophy is an attempt at unification. Nevertheless, giving heed to the philosophical tradition, i.e., of metaphysics, teaches us that philosophy treats of the Being of what-is. What is, then, the relationship of *hen* to the Being of what-is? The relation of *hen* to *ousia*? Since Being is not an empty word, not a bill of exchange, but is always apprehended concretely as presence, as coming-into-presence (*Anwesenheit*), what relation is maintained between *Anwesenheit* and *Einheit* [unity]?

The difficulty of this question, says Jean Beaufret, appears with very great clarity when we refer to the philosophy of Aristotle. In Aristotle, this *pollachos legomenon*,¹³ which Being is, appears under four guises:

1. according to the categories
2. according to the relationship, *dynamis – energeia*
3. according to the relationship, *ousia – symbebēkos*
4. as *alēthes* and *pseudos*.

What is the unity of this region [*Gegend*] that is nonetheless one, which is Being? Aristotle does not say.

Heidegger returns to Aristotle's example, limiting himself to the third guise of Being. What is the relation between *symbebēkos* and entering-into-presence?

In answering this question we must first try not to think *symbebēkos* in terms of the scholastic interpretation of the opposition of substance and accident such as is translated into a theory of grammar, in which the accident relates to the substance only as the attribute relates to the subject in a sentence.

If we consider a rose, we distinguish (in seeing it) the necessary from the accidental *symbebēkota*. We see, from the being-rose, i.e., we see from the entering-into-presence of the rose, that what is essential is not its color, but the multiplicity of its petals. Understood in terms of the entering-into-presence of the rose, the *symbebēkos* is in a certain manner understood from the past: the petals of the rose have *always-already* arrived with the presence of the rose (in the sense of the Greek perfect tense).

But this we are able to see thanks only to that other gathering which is the *Logos*. The *Logos* always projects itself in the direction of the things that appear in a gathering of *their own*. For Greek thought,

the entering-into-presence of man is the opening for the entering-into-presence of the world which opposes itself to him.

But where does the encounter take place between what enters into presence and the being whose mode of presencing is to open itself to receive this presencing? Where, if not in *alētheia*? This is why *alētheia* cannot be translated by "truth."

Summary of the Session of Sunday, September 1

This session took the form, largely, of a *Sonntagsseminar* [Sunday seminar], of which there is no particular need to give an account. Heidegger threw into relief for us the figure of his teacher Husserl by means of some anecdotes showing what that passion was which drove the author of the *Logische Untersuchungen* [Logical Investigations].

Let us say by way of a résumé that for Husserl there was one thing which did not exist; that was the profound sense of history as tradition (as that which liberates us), in the sense in which Plato is here, in which Aristotle is here and speaks to us, and is present to us, and must be present to us.

And this leads us into the presence of Hegel.

Earlier Heidegger acquainted us with the phrase *Bedürfnis der Philosophie*. The problem then was to understand this genitive both as an objective genitive and as a subjective genitive, and the subjective genitive seemed to be predominant. Yesterday,¹⁴ it was the word "philosophy" which he made bear the weight of the whole investigation. In order to understand the word "philosophy" this time in its precise meaning, we have to anticipate and consider that sentence on page 25 which, in a sense, contains everything: "Philosophy, as a totality of knowledge produced through reflection, becomes a system, an organic whole of concepts whose highest law is not the understanding but reason."¹⁵

In this sentence, where the word *Grund* [ground] is conspicuous by its absence, all the words count, and all evoke commentary. Words to be explained are: reflection, production, totality, knowledge, system, organic, concept, law, understanding, reason.

The central word is *system*. This is taken over from the Greek *systema* in which are to be heard:

1. *syn, das Zusammen*, joining together, assembling. This is the *Macht der Vereinigung* [power of union].

2. *tithēmi, setzen*, to place—i.e., the positing of Being as objectivity as determined by Kant.

In thinking this notion of system we can measure the great distance which separates Hegel from Kant. Kant speaks of system in the *Methodenlehre* [Methodology]. Nevertheless, system is possible only beginning with Fichte, and it is Hegel himself who realizes this possibility, since Schelling falls back outside the system at the end of his life. Thus nothing else in philosophy is a system in the precise sense of this word except those of Fichte and Hegel.

That strictly speaking there is no system in Kant (and even less in Aristotle and Saint Thomas) is what we experience when we reflect on this passage from the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably require as the last bearer of all things, is for human reason the veritable abyss. Eternity itself, in all its terrible sublimity, as depicted by a Haller, is far from making the same overwhelming impression on the mind [Gemüt]; for it only *measures* the duration of things, it does not *support* them. We cannot put aside, and yet also cannot endure the thought, that a being, which we directly represent to ourselves as supreme amongst all possible beings, should, as it were, say to itself: "I am from eternity to eternity, and outside me there is nothing save what is through my will, *but whence then am I?*" All support here fails us; and the *greatest* perfection, no less than the *least* perfection, is unsubstantial and baseless for the merely speculative reason, which makes not the least effort to retain either the one or the other, and feels indeed no loss in allowing them to vanish entirely.¹⁶

This text, in which God appears abysmal to himself, so to speak, is taken from the chapter, "The Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God." The impossibility in question appears simultaneously as the impossibility of the system itself, if we question this text a little.

It begins by naming the system with the paraphrase: "unconditioned necessity which we so indispensably require as the last bearer of all things," and designates it the veritable abyss—*Abgrund*—for human reason. The abyss of the system is the result of the fact that speculative reason, as Kant conceives it, finds nothing to establish on the level of that which, as the ultimate ground of everything, is essential to producing the system. This is because for speculative reason there is never properly anything

there but an "idea" (in the sense of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, wherein "idea" is opposed to "intuition" [Anschauung] and to "concept" [Begriff]). Speculatively, this is only an idea of reason, and it is because of this that it is unfathomable, *ab-gründig*. Also we can say that it is in this text that we find Kant's explicit renunciation of a speculative system.

Now it is precisely here—if we let history speak—that everything is overturned, and this within the life-time of Kant himself, who in his old age witnessed with consternation what was beginning to dawn in Fichte. It can be said that Fichte and Hegel are in quest of a *Grund* [ground] in that place where for Kant there could only be *Abgrund* [abyss]. In thirty years everything will be reversed to the point that it could be said in his *Berlin Discourse* Hegel speaks in a way diametrically opposed to the text of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which we have just read. The signposts leading to this point, which can be quickly indicated, are:

1. *Fichte*, in the respect that he is the one who knows the answer to Kant's question which has no answer: "But whence then am I?" The answer is $I = I$.

2. The Hegel of the *Differenzschrift*—and this is what we began to grasp for ourselves in bringing our investigation to bear on the difficult sentence on page 17: "The form that the need of philosophy would receive if it were to be expressed as a presupposition provides the transition from the need of philosophy to the instrument of philosophizing, to reflection as reason."¹⁷

This sentence places us before *reflection as reason*. We must note first of all that in Hegel the word reflection changes in meaning. It designates here what will be called dialectical thought in the future. Later Hegel will reserve this word (reflection) for the understanding alone and will characterize as "Reflexionsphilosophie" [philosophy of reflection] philosophies other than his own.

If we question this sentence, we see that reason as speculative, in which Kant experiences finitude and incapacity, appears from the first as fully capable of being the instrument of philosophical activity, i.e., of that activity productive of the system. Speculation becomes autonomous. This reveals a power of speculation which was impossible for Kant. However, the whole problem is to explain the sentence. This is why the task decided upon for today (September 2) will consist in identifying reflection in general, next in distinguishing reflection as the understanding, and finally in perceiving reflection as reason.

Summary of the Session of September 2

Heidegger opens the proceedings on September 2, by repeating that the frame of mind peculiar to the seminar avoids merely historical questioning just as it refrains from taking the text as a springboard into questions which are "ours."

The second question, posed last time, but remaining undeveloped, is now taken up again: "Can one speak of unity before severing?" The first question (concerning the dynamics of *Entzweiung*) was treated in a philosophico-historical manner. The second now demands of us a philosophical approach. But in order to ask this question on the basis of our reading of Hegel, Heidegger again draws his support from the sentence on page 14, "When the power of union . . . etc."¹⁸ The question is then:

When the power of union disappears, what is it in this type of experience that is experienced along with the disappearance of unity? It is unity itself. For we not only can, but we must speak of unity before severing. Yet, to answer "unity" is to answer theoretically. The question actually demands of us a pre-philosophical approach. Heidegger invites us to the kind of preparation which is more properly phenomenological.

We take as our example: "Night falls; it is no longer day." And, in this particular climate in which night follows abruptly upon day, we are directed through the example into the experience of a relationship of very intense opposition. *Where* does this transition of day into night take place, "in what" does it take place? What is the unity of which this transition is the severing? What is this Same within which day passes into night? In such an experience men are non-thematically in relation to something which is neither day nor night.

What? World, light, space, time, etc. . . . the answers which are all too general witness, then, to a phenomenological embarrassment. The example seemed to be too difficult. We take this other one therefore: a pot which breaks into pieces. For us to see pieces (as such) we must have a relationship to unity. If we consider that this unity has been called *hen* since Heraclitus, and that the One has been, since that origin, the other name of Being, then we find that we are referred back to the *Seinsverständnis* [understanding of Being] of which *Sein und Zeit* speaks.

In this connection Heidegger recalls the nature of the criticisms that followed the publication of *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger was accused of having abstracted *Sein* from "is" and of having then

distilled his "philosophy" out of that "abstraction." To this he still answers today: "Being is not an abstraction from "is," but rather I can say "is" only within the manifestness of Being."¹⁹

We return to *Zerrissenheit* [tornness] understood on the basis of *zer-rissen* [torn], of *Riss* [tear]. It is possible to experience this only in a certain "turning back upon" unity, so that that *has* to be present in Hegel. And indeed on page 16 we read: "In the conflict of the understanding with reason, strength comes to the former only to the extent that the latter renounces itself."²⁰ If we understand reason in the Kantian sense (= power of principles, power of unity), reason abdicates in favor of the understanding; the power of unity retreats in favor of the understanding, the peculiarity of which is the establishing of opposites. Reason is not gone, but it is in the background. Risking an over-interpretation, we might say that *Vernunft* [reason] as the power of unity, in other words the *Vernehmen des Seins* [apprehending of Being], gives way to the ordering of beings, in such a way that the ontological difference is in play in the retreat of reason behind the products of the understanding.

Having thus returned to page 16, we continue reading there: "The need of philosophy *can* be expressed as its *presupposition* if philosophy—which begins with itself—can comprise a sort of antechamber."²¹ And two lines further down we read: "That which we call the presupposition of philosophy is nothing else than *the need expressed in discourse*."²² Heidegger asks what *ausgesprochene* [expressed] means here. In the following sentence, the expression *hiedurch für die Reflexion gesetzt* [posited by this means for reflection] indicates that the real translation for *ausgesprochene* is "expressed in discourse, and not accomplished in philosophy." The need is stated in discourse and not satisfied.

From there reason addresses itself to reflection, which expresses in discourse the need of philosophy in order to show to reason what form philosophy will take. The whole of this page 16 will seem *necessary*, as a scaffolding or a means by which to pass from the need of philosophy (as "discourse about") to the instrument of philosophy. Reason's presentation of the task of philosophy to the understanding, a task which the understanding itself cannot perform, will reveal the lack of the instrument—and hence the transition to it.

Now, then, more slowly: The presupposition divides in two, showing that it is a reflection of the understanding which establishes the opposites. The latter are now the Absolute itself on the one hand

and the totality of severings on the other. The second presupposition states that the stepping out of consciousness from the totality *must have* the form of the severing into Being and non-Being, concept and Being, finitude and infinitude. Here *Begriff* [concept] is taken to be the "representation of something in general," and "Being" is taken to be "objectivity." In these examples, what unity is it of which this *Entzweiung* is the *Entzweiung*? For Being and Non-Being it is becoming; for concept and Being it is the Absolute; for finite and infinite it is life.

To the understanding, the absolute synthesis is that which it can neither grasp nor establish; the absolute synthesis is for the understanding that which is unformed and opposed to its determinations. To reason speaking to the understanding from the standpoint of severing philosophy appears, nevertheless (This is what the first "however" indicates: "The task of philosophy, *however*, consists in . . . "),²³ as the union of these two presuppositions which, as indicated by the second "however" (in the sentence, "It is awkward, *however*, . . .")²⁴ are not separated by reason. This absolute synthesis is the last thing that the understanding—disquieted by reason, yet within *its own* horizon—can perceive. For the understanding the Absolute synthesis is the "duty" of which it can (only) "speak."

To sum up, what have we accomplished in making our way through this page? The lack of an instrument for the task of philosophy has been thrown into relief, while, at the same time, with the two presuppositions and their union, that which will constitute the theme of speculation has been manifested. What the understanding is incapable of understanding is how the limitations at the heart of reason, which because they are related to the Absolute have been annihilated, are, in that very way, *produced* in the "annihilating" relationship itself. This is why Heidegger now refers us to this sentence on page 33: "The need of philosophy can be satisfied in having penetrated as far as both the principle of the annihilation of all fixed oppositions and the relation of the limited to the Absolute. . . ." ²⁵

There is "satisfaction," i.e., "peace" at first, because only *what is fixed and established* disappears, while the *oppositions* appear in their vitality.

Finally, during the reading of the text and translation of page 17, at the close of the session, two remarks are made by Heidegger relating to the terms there.

—One concerns the beginning of the second paragraph in

"Reflection as the Instrument of Philosophy," and has to do with the expression *die isolierte Reflexion* [isolated reflection], which is better understood as *die isolierende Reflexion* [isolating reflection].

—The other relates to the term *Bestehen* [standing], which comes at the end of this same paragraph, a term which is constantly being taken up by Hegel, but without analysis, as though some limitation had just been come up against at the heart of the Hegelian philosophy.

Summary of the Session of September 4

Heidegger opens this session with an observation concerning the word *Begriff* [concept] found on page 16 beside the word *Sein* [Being]: "Begriff und Sein." He explains the meaning of *Begriff* in terms of the Kantian *Vorstellung* [Representation], the meaning of which is twofold, namely: (1) The particular representation (for example, the intuition of this book). (2) Representation in general [the concept] (for example, the book as book).

Heidegger specifies that it is a matter of the latter here, the representation of all objects, of the object as object.

Next we are led back to what had attracted our attention at the beginning of the last session: an interpretation of the text which is not merely historical but which also engages us in the question of Being. Now Heidegger asks whether it can be said specifically that the question of Being is the question of metaphysics. The answer is that, even if metaphysics questions in the direction of the Being of what is ("What is that particular being by which a being is?"), it does not question concerning Being itself. When I ask a question, the starting point and the general thrust of the question reside in that beginning with which I question in the direction of . . . But we will have to see this phenomenologically in an example.

Proceeding from some questioning about the color of the leaves on this tree which I see in the garden, we ask ourselves what the starting point is which gives its thrust to the question. Later, no longer considering the color of this particular tree but color itself as color, Heidegger asks, "What is peculiar to all color?" He underscores the respect in which such questioning, in which the thing is grasped *as it is*, differs from the questioning of Husserl which seeks to clarify the constitution of the object of consciousness by analyzing the phenomenological meaning of a sensory datum, in other words, by phenomenologizing the Kantian analysis of the anticipations of perception. By not proceeding to any reduction to consciousness, but rather by holding the thing itself in view, we are

led to answer, "All color as color is spread out." Then, as a counter-test, turning our attention to sound, we see that sound is in space two ways: on the one hand it comes from a place; on the other hand it passes through space. But sound as sound is not *spread out* in space; it is spread out only in time.

Heidegger now returns to his first question which is the one concerning the *origin* and *direction* of metaphysics. Metaphysics begins with what-is, rising as far as Being, and then returning to what-is as what-is to explain it in the light of Being. In order to explain this return to what-is, it is proposed that we take as our example a questioning which begins with nature in the broadest sense, which asks, "What is nature?" What nature is will not be determined by an answer that names something separate from nature. *Energeia* is not outside and behind that which is, like a higher being; it is in what-is. The whole problem is to understand this relationship.²⁶

But when we speak of metaphysics in this way, we mean that metaphysics asks about Being insofar as it determines what-is as what-is. Now, in another sense, the question of Being is quite *another* question. It does not question Being insofar as it determines what-is as what-is; it questions Being as Being.

If the ontological difference which appears here is the greatest danger for thinking, it is because it *always* represents Being within the horizon of metaphysics as what-is, whereas the question concerning what-is as what-is, i.e., the metaphysical question, has another Meaning than the question of Being as Being. This may be expressed negatively by saying that the question of Being as Being is not just that of the Being of what-is raised to the second power.

The problem now arises of formulating the question of Being in its relation to Hegel. This can be done only in working from the Hegelian text itself, beginning with the place in which, if not the answer, then at least the problematic of this answer is formulated. Thus we begin at the place where the attempt is made to determine to what we may attribute the fact that the need of philosophy (i.e., philosophy's questions about what-is) finds satisfaction. For the satisfaction of the need contains the answer to the question of the Being of what-is. On page 33 of the text we read, "The need of philosophy can be satisfied in having penetrated. . . ."²⁷ Philosophy, i.e., metaphysics, thus attains the answer to its questions when the Absolute is grasped as the Absolute. This task is called for on page 17: "The Absolute must be reflected, it must be posited."²⁸

In the most popular sense of the word "reflection," we hear in it the Latin *re-flexere*. It is peculiar to reflection to turn back upon something. Toward what? Toward the *ego*. In Descartes, the essence of the *cogitare* is grasped in the formula: *cogito me cogitare*. It makes the *cogito* appear as *me cogitare*, and makes the *ego* as *cogitans* appear as a *cogitatum* = object. In the Kantian language of the transcendental deduction this is formulated as follows: "The *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations." The title of Part 17 of the same section is: "The Supreme Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception is the Supreme Principle of all Employment of the Understanding";²⁹ all *cogitare* is consequently an *ego cogito me cogitare*.

What Kant says of transcendental apperception aims at the finite essence of man; and this relation of thought to unity is grasped only by Hegel. This principle of union at the level of the finite understanding is absolutized in such a manner that Hegel raises the power of union to the absolute power: what is finite in man becomes the infinite Absolute.

In this connection, Heidegger reminds us that we must not understand the infinite as the "without-end" of the understanding, but rather as the raising up [*Aufhebung*] of the finite. Furthermore, he points out that the first step in this raising up is accomplished in the sentence of Fichte, "The I posits itself." To the extent that the I posits itself as self-positing, it posits simultaneously the Not-I as an identity. But, when the principle is: I posit myself as I-positing and thus posit the Not-I, which of the two is the supreme principle? The principle just stated or the principle of identity? Which has precedence over the other, Fichte's principle or the principle of identity? Is formal logic the basis for transcendental logic, or is transcendental logic the basis for formal logic?

In the problem of the transcendental apperception, which in Kant is at its zenith, the relation to unity sets the standard. This question, which in Kant is on the level of the finite understanding, will run through all of transcendental idealism. The difference between formal logic and transcendental logic together with their relationship to one another is both the difference and the relationship between an ordinary principle and a speculative principle.

Returning to the sentence of Hegel, "The Absolute must be reflected, it must be posited," Heidegger reminds us that reflection is the bending back toward *itself* which is the true thinker to the extent that it reflects. From this comes the general meaning of to

think in order to reflect: to reflect is to think about a subject, to think a thought. Reflection thus places itself mediatingly between the thinker and what it is he thinks: consciousness becomes self-consciousness. And Heidegger closes the session by calling our attention to the fact that Hegel does not say, "It is necessary to reflect on the Absolute," but rather: "It is necessary that the Absolute be reflected."

Summary of the Session of September 5

The question which dominated the seminar of September 5 was that of the *danger of the ontological difference*. "The danger is that, within the horizon of metaphysics, the difference will lead to the representing of Being as a particular being. Nevertheless, when Aristotle defines Being as *energeia*, or Plato defines Being as *eidōs*, *energeia* and *eidōs* are not beings. Metaphysics resists defining Being as a particular being, however tempted it may be to do so."³⁰ From whence two stages of the seminar in answer to the questions:

1. What does "ontological difference" mean?
2. What is the fundamental experience which determines Aristotle to experience what-is (in its Being) as *energeia*; which determines Plato to experience what-is as *eidōs*; Kant as *Gegenstand*?

I. What does "ontological difference" mean?

It can be understood in two ways: (a) To begin with, the expression "ontological difference" is constructed like the phrase "The green tree"; "ontological," then, is the adjective of the noun "difference." From this first point of view, it is the difference itself between Being and what-is that is "ontological," as it is said of the leaf that it is green. (b) But—and this is the other way of understanding it—might not the difference itself between Being and what-is support and render possible ontology as the fundamental discipline of metaphysics?

This second way of understanding the ontological difference is justified by the fact that all metaphysics indeed moves within the difference (constantly this is emphasized—notably in St. Thomas), but no metaphysics recognizes this difference in the dimension in which it unfolds *as* the difference.

The question then becomes, what is the relation between the difference between Being and what-is *and* ontology? Is this question

apprehensible to metaphysics, considering that the latter, as ontology, is grounded on the difference itself? Can the difference which renders metaphysics possible as metaphysics be taken into consideration by the discipline upon which metaphysics is based, namely ontology? In logical terms, can the consequence take cognizance of its principle? No. I can begin with the foundation and determine the consequence, but the opposite is impossible. The horizon within which it is a question of the ontological difference cannot be evident to ontology explicitly as a theme.

Let us take an example: In Aristotle, and for him, the ontological difference refers to the duality *theion-energeia*. But *to theion* cannot be a term of difference. *To theion* is called *to timiotaton on*, the being which is highest in dignity. *To theion*, then, is explicitly an ontic determination. Of the two terms, *to theion - hē energeia*, the latter, *hē energeia*, alone refers to the ontological difference. It is *energeia*, that names Being (*to einai*); and it is on the understanding of *einai* as *energeia* that Aristotle's ontology is grounded.

In order to understand that misinterpretation of Aristotle (among others) according to which *to theion* is a term of difference on which ontology is grounded, we must take a leap beyond the labyrinth of questions, a leap into medieval theology. There God was posited as *Summum Ens*, and *Summum Ens* was interpreted as *actus purus essendi*. How is this interpretation possible? How is this relationship of *Summum Ens* to *Actus Purus* connected with the Aristotelian relationship of *to theion* and *energeia*? Why does *energeia* become *actualitas*? Because *ergon* and *energeia* are understood from the time of the Romans in terms of *agere*, to do in an ontic sense. The name for this ontic "doing" is *creatio*. On this basis, *Summum ens* becomes *creator*, and all *ens* is the *ens creatum* (or *in creatum*). Having reduced *energeia* on the one hand to the ontic determination of *actualitas*, and the *Summum ens* with St. Thomas, on the other, to the *Ipsum esse*, ontology suppresses *ipso facto* every possibility of a question concerning Being. All modern philosophy is encumbered with this ontic stamp which it takes over from the Christian ontology of the Middle Ages. To restore philosophy to itself is to disencumber it of its Christian element out of concern for the Greek element, not for itself, but as the origin of philosophy.

What, then, is actually fundamental for ontology in *energeia*? In what respect is *energeia* a reference to the ontological difference? Through what fundamental experience does Aristotle arrive at *energeia*?

A fundamental experience is the manner in which what-is is

experienced. Thus Kant experiences what-is as nature, in the Newtonian sense. And here nature is that which is because truth, in the Cartesian realm of thought, is certainty.

The experience of what-is in its Being as *energeia* situates Aristotle in relation to Plato. What, for example, is a chair for Plato? A *me on*, a non-being [*Un-Seiendes*] (as distinct from *ouk on*, absolute Non-Being [*Nicht-Sein schlechthin*]). But what is the ontological character of this *me on*? This mode of being deficient Plato calls *eidolon*, idol, in distinguishing it from *eidos* while at the same time likening it to it. *Eidos* is that which manifests itself, that which is seen. However, the *eidolon*, without which I would not see the *eidos* of the table, indicates that the *eidos* of the table is *blurred* (in this case by the wood), not by the wood as wood, but by the wood of which the table is *made*. The fundamental experience on the basis of which Plato determines the *on* as *eidos*, the experience of the *ontōs on*, is that of pure presence, the character of which is to manifest itself in the open.

Aristotle's grounding experience is determined by its relation to that of Plato. The usual interpretation is to maintain that Plato confines reality to the Ideas above and that Aristotle brings them back to earth and embeds them, so to speak, in things—Idealism and Realism. The change which actually takes place here is that *eidos* becomes the *morphē* of a *tode ti* in movement and at rest. Aristotle grasps these beings as *kinoumena* and not as *me onta*, and that accordingly on the foundation of the experience of *kinesis*. (Cf. *Physics*, Bk. III, 201^a, 10–11: *hē tou dynamei ontos entelecheia hē toiouton, kinēsis estin.*³¹)

Because *kinēsis* is itself defined as *energeia* (or rather *entelecheia*), *energeia* appears in Aristotle as the highest determination of Being itself.

Summary of the Session of September 6

After the reading of the summary of the session of September 5, Heidegger reminds us that the Latin translation of the Greek *energeia* by *actus* prepared the way for the interpretation of doing as *creatio*, the source of which is, of course the Genesis story.

The session proper opens on this idea, that all metaphysics is grounded on a fundamental experience of what-is which in each case is unique to a thinker: for example, in Kant the fundamental experience is that of what-is as "nature." *Erfahrung* (experience)—the key word in the *Critique*—does not in any way

have the vague meaning of that which one is aware of. In Kant, experience is experience in the scientific sense, i.e., the experience of science *par excellence*, which has been mathematical physics from the beginning of modern times up to the present. The decisive characteristic of mathematical physics, which is at the heart of modern science in general, is signalized today, for example, by the fact that biology is becoming biophysics and that it is only as biophysics that contemporary biology can foresee and prepare for mastery over the *genesis* of man. In the social sciences, the same transformation is taking place: anthropology is becoming an anthropophysics, in which the mathematical–statistical treatment of data constitutes the essential method. More generally, it is becoming apparent that cybernetics is the crossroads of present–day science. We have to keep this in view if we wish to understand the text of Hegel which we have before us in its real dimensions, and not as a simple object of erudition.

The fundamental experience of what–is for any thinking determines which particular being is to be taken as normative. As it is nature for Kant, so it is *der Geist* [Spirit] for Hegel, and Spirit in the sense of absolute consciousness. We recall in this connection that according to Hegel's own words it is with Descartes that philosophy treads for the first time upon that *festes Land* [*terra firma*, solid ground] which is "consciousness." The difference between Descartes and Hegel is that Descartes merely sets foot on it, whereas Hegel measures it through and through. Descartes discovers this ground in the *Meditationes de prima philosophia*; Hegel surveys it throughout his System of Science, i.e., in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* just as in the three parts of the *Logic*: the logic of Being (*Sein*), the logic of essence (*Wesen*) as the truth of Being, and the logic of the concept (*Begriff*) as the truth of the essence in which Being is included. Of course, in this surveying, in this Hegelian geo–metry which measures the ground of consciousness in its totality, there is no question of a mathematical measurement; the measurement is metaphysical and total, i.e., "absolute."

We will definitively have left behind the mathematical image when we ask ourselves which method it is that determines the absolute measurement of the realm of consciousness. This method is dialectic, which accomplishes itself through the power of reason (*Vernunft*). In *The Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling* there appears for the first time what for Hegel is his unique task: to determine the relation of reason to the Absolute. Here we read the following sentence (p. 35):

The method of the system, which is to be called neither synthetic nor analytic, manifests itself most purely when it appears as an unfolding of reason itself, which instead of forever calling back into itself the emanation of its manifestation as a duality—it would thus only annihilate it—builds itself within it into an identity conditioned by the duality, sets this relative identity over against itself again, so that the system progresses to the completion of the objective totality, and unites it with the subjective totality which stands over against it, leading to an infinite intuition of the world whose expansion at the same time has contracted into the richest and simplest identity.³²

The clarification of this sentence (in which connection Heidegger points out that the aim of the seminar could be expressed in this way: to make possible the reading of *all* the Hegelian texts through the comprehension of *this* fundamental sentence) is initiated by the explanation of the central expression: *Unendliche Weltanschauung* [infinite intuition of the world].

What does *Welt* [world] mean in *Weltanschauung*? *Welt* means, as it already did in the Kantian antinomies, what-is in its totality.

What does *Anschauung* [view] mean? Here, taking our departure from the Kantian vocabulary, as we must do for Hegel as well as for Fichte and Schelling, we must understand *Anschauung* as the representation of the particular as the particular, and this as opposed to the concept, which is the representation of something in general.

—What does *Weltanschauung* mean, then? *Weltanschauung* means: the intuition of what-is in its totality, and, since it is a matter of intuition here, this totality is something singular, unique.

—And now what does *unendliche Weltanschauung* mean? What does infinite intuition mean? For Hegel the finite is characterized by establishing. To establish or fix is to posit, in the sense of setting something apart for itself and consequently positing it in opposition. Positing isolates something posited *over against* something else. Thus, all determination, everything determined, is surrounded for finitude by the non-determined, by nothingness. *Omnis determinatio negatio est*. If this is what the finite is, then the infinite (*das Un-endliche*: the in-finite), in contrast, is that positing which does not make the opposites disappear, but preserves them in their opposition at the heart of their *Vereinigung* [union].

Nevertheless, insofar as this *Vereinigung* finds itself posited in this very way in its turn, it enters as such into opposition with another

unity, and these two unities demand afresh their own *Vereinigung*. Such is the fundamental and internal law of dialectic.

The question that comes immediately to mind, then, is whether and how the dialectical movement itself can avoid falling back under the domination of the finite under the form of false infinity, of *Endlosigkeit* [endlessness]. Various answers, in particular that of circularity, founder on the difficulty rather than resolve it. It is just as vain to call in from the outside the unchangeableness of the Absolute. Neither is it a question of seeking the particular stopping point at which false infinity might by chance halt itself. Let us rather seek out the identity which will escape this difficulty in advance: this is what Hegel calls in his text: *die unentzweiteste Identität* [the most unsevered identity] (p. 34).

Why is it called *unentzweiteste*? Because this unity is that to which *Entzweiung* is originally unknown. *Un-entzweit* [un-severed] is more precise than *un-endlich* [in-finite]. *Un-entzweit* names the two terms of the established opposition *simultaneously* in order to escape them. What is thus expressed is a *Setzen* [positing] which is no longer the simple opposing of opposites, nor the simple unity itself which is posited by opposites, in opposition to which a new opposition arises which demands a new unity. Rather, what is expressed is a unity such that it contains in itself all of the oppositions. This, finally, is the meaning of the central speculative expression: *unendliche Weltanschauung*.

If now, setting out from this sentence which has been clarified, we turn to the one on page 14 (When the power of union, etc. . . .), then the wealth and precision of its content finally show themselves to us.

Thus the Absolute is *die unentzweiteste Identität*, the most unsevered identity. If the theme of philosophy must be the Absolute, and its movement dialectic, then the Absolute must be in view at every step of the dialectic, but as not yet unfolded. The task of reason is nothing other than its unfolding, i.e., the union of all the oppositions in the light of the most unsevered identity, which is no longer in any way a relative identity. This is why Hegel writes somewhere that the only interest of reason is to *aufheben* [raise up and preserve] the opposites which have become established.

The last part of the session is devoted to an explanation of the term *aufheben*. *Aufheben* means:

1. "To place a thing upon," for example, to place a book on the table in order to see it. The fundamental action of dialectic is actually first to make the oppositions appear, to see the opposites. *Aufheben*

in this first sense would be the Latin *tollere*, in the simple sense of to take (*Tolle, lege*).

2. To lift up the opposition of the two opposites, thus placed in view, into their unity. The latter is like an arc which goes higher than the two opposites which confront one another; and in this sense *aufheben* would be the Latin *elevare*.

3. To guard, to preserve, to put in a safe place (for example, *ein Geschenk gut aufheben* [to take good care of a gift]). This preserving realizes itself in the absolute identity in which the opposites, far from disappearing as did the cows in the night of the Schellingian identity, are preserved.

Jean Beaufret observes at this point that none of the three meanings which are always simultaneously present in *aufheben* has the slightest negative character, and that consequently to translate *Aufhebung* (as is often done) by "suppression" or "abolition" is very often a misinterpretation. The historical scope of this observation is then revealed in connection with the famous sentence of Kant: "I had thus to lift up knowledge in order to obtain a place for faith."³³ That does not mean to "abolish" knowledge, but rather to make it appear by raising it to its unity (possibility of experience), within its limits (or rather in its place), which is the whole meaning of critical delimitation, and ought to be understood positively. It is precisely this putting in place of theoretical reason which permits the putting in place of practical reason to appear.

Summary of the Session of September 8

This session is the last one. Heidegger remarks that the seminar has not reached the place he wanted it to. However, there is neither regret nor reproach to anyone. Our aim was to make appear in their reality the two terms of the opposition that separates the fundamental experience of metaphysics from the question concerning the meaning of Being which appeared for the first time in *Sein und Zeit*.

This remark made, we return to the rubrics Hegel uses to express the way in which reason grasps the Absolute. These rubrics are: reflection—construction—production—contraction. We first ask what realm it is in which all these moments of the grasping of the Absolute by reason are realized. This realm is *das Bewusstsein*—consciousness.

1. *First Moment: Reflection*: How does Hegel understand "reflection"? For the answer we return to page 17: "The Absolute must be reflected. . . ." ³⁴ We must pay attention here to Hegel's

language, which does not say, "It is necessary to reflect on the Absolute," but says, rather, "The Absolute must be reflected." *Etwas reflektieren* [to reflect something] is different from *über etwas reflektieren* [to reflect on something]. For example, I can reflect on this book, be it on its binding, or even on the difficulty of reading it, etc., each time the book appears *in einer Hinsicht*—within a particular angle of vision. There belongs, then, to "reflecting upon . . ." a well defined horizon, that *within which* I reflect upon the book. But now what does *reflektieren* taken alone mean? No longer is there present a perspective within which I may grasp the thing in advance; there is no longer a definite *Vor-griff* [anti-cipation]. "The Absolute must be reflected" is said, then, outside of every "perspective." Every perspective in which the Absolute is aimed actually misses the Absolute, because every perspective as such is finite. The Absolute, on the contrary, is *die un-entzweiteste Identität*, i.e., the unity which is the ultimate foundation of all possible oppositions. That it must be reflected signifies therefore that it must be reflected on the basis of itself, on the basis of the most simple and the most complete unity. This signifies in turn that it must manifest itself for consciousness, i.e., reflect itself for consciousness. *Sich spiegeln* [to mirror oneself] means, when applied to the Absolute, that "it brings itself into appearance."³⁵ This kind of "mirroring" entitles the grasping on the part of reason to be called "speculative."³⁶ In Leibniz (who is evoked by someone at this point), it is a different matter; there it is human reason which is a mirror.

It is in this way, then, that the Absolute appears for reason, for consciousness—that is what "to be reflected" means for the Absolute. But how does reason take hold of (take hold of, and not receive³⁷—for there is nothing here of "receptivity") the phenomenon of the Absolute? In what way does reason make itself appear for itself as the Absolute? What is the relation of reason to unity? That is, to Being as well? The fundamental characteristic of idealism in its relation to Being is *Setzung, positio* [positing].

But what does "to posit" mean? *Ich setze einen Baum* [I "posit," "position," a tree.] That means I plant a tree. Afterwards, if the tree finds its growth from out of itself, it was nevertheless I who first planted it. Is it a question of planting the Absolute like a tree? Of course not, because it is *already* "posited," it is "given," it is that which I find as already there in advance. But then, what does *setzen* mean as characterizing the grasping of the Absolute?

That the Absolute appears for consciousness does not mean that the Absolute bursts into consciousness as into a cage. It appears for

consciousness already in relation to the fundamental characteristic of consciousness, which is "positing." But again the question arises, what sort of "positing"? This is an important question, first of all for the interpretation of Greek thought. In Greek, to posit is called *thesis* and is to be seen in *apothēke*, the meaning of which is the same as *apophansis*—to let a thing stand from out of itself, as it is, i.e., as it presences.³⁸ But modern "positing" is different; the Latin *repraesentatio* is the best interpretation of it. The modern *re-*(*re-praesentatio*) refers back to the *ego cogito*. (*Re-* here = *auf mich zurück* [back upon myself]). The "I" lets something stand over against itself, which also means that something has become "object." All of this, which is very clear, nevertheless is obscured by idealist pretensions.

The question of "representation" thus raised is now the occasion for a sort of training exercise in phenomenology in which everything suddenly becomes too difficult because it is too simple, and in which everyone is surprised to find himself so extremely "awkward." There is a long and profitable digression, the stages of which are the following:

—*Repraesentatio* = *Vorstellung*. For example, the Louvre at Paris. For us at this moment it is a "representation." Where is it? In our heads? Then how can we avoid saying still more scientifically: in the brain? But an autopsy of the brain does not reveal any "representations."

—Next we say that it is an image. The question then becomes: When we represent the Louvre to ourselves, is it an image that we represent? No: it is the Louvre. *Always* (and even in *Vergegenwärtigung* [bringing to mind], even when I relate to something simply in thinking it) I am in relation to the things themselves, as I am in relation now to this book which I am looking at and handling. Nevertheless, despite this immediateness, there are some differences, the outline of which phenomenology must pursue. Even though the Louvre now is not an image for me, still, I cannot enter it through the door, while I can open the book which is here on the table. Insofar as the book is here, I must say, then, that it is the book that presents itself to me. *Vorstellung* here signifies that the book itself *stellt sich mir vor* [sets itself before me]. As opposed to *Vergegenwärtigung* [bringing to mind] this situation is one of *Wahrnehmung* [perception].

—What is essential in perception? Someone says *aisthesis* and draws the response that "hell had already started with the Greeks, precisely with the distinction between *aisthesis* and *noesis*." What is

essential is the notion of *Leibhaftigkeit* [corporeality]; *in der Wahrnehmung ist das Anwesende leibhaftig da* (in perception, that which enters into presence affects my own body in flesh and bone). The answer is yet another question: What is this *Leib* [body] from which the adjective *leibhaftig* is derived? The French translation is *la chaire* [flesh]. But flesh is what I myself am; it is my flesh, my body, *mein Leib*. Do I extend in my flesh as far as the Louvre? No, and this is precisely why the Louvre is merely the object of a simple *Vergegenwärtigung* (which always includes the possibility, though unrealized, of *leibhaft* [fleshly] perception also.) It is then indeed the *Leib* which characterizes perception. This *Leib* is something like the reach³⁹ of the human body (Yesterday evening the moon was closer than the Louvre.).

The word "body" which has just come forward risks compromising everything again. We have to grasp the difference between *Leib* and *Körper* [body]. For example, when one places himself on a scale, one does not measure his *Leib*, but only the weight of his "body." Or again: the limit of *Leib* is not the limit of "body." The limit of body is the skin. The limit of *Leib* is more difficult to determine. It is not *Welt* [world], but probably no more than *Welt* is it *umwelt* [the world around me].

There is no *Welt* except where there is language, i.e., understanding of Being. This provokes some reflections on the work of Karl von Frisch, who is endeavoring to determine what the bee sees. This means that "to see" is here in question, if we admit that, despite a well established French tradition, cows never see the trains pass.

Everyone can see that we have now moved off rather far from Hegel. But Heidegger reminds us that "practice in phenomenology is more important than the reading of Hegel."⁴⁰ Which does not at all prevent us from returning to Hegel.

So to recapitulate what has been said thus far: (1) The Absolute must appear for man—for consciousness.⁴¹ (2) Human consciousness has as its fundamental characteristic for moderns that of being a *Setzen*. (3) *Setzen* (or *positio*) is multivocal. In distinction from *setzen* in the sense of "planting a tree," there is *thesis* in the sense of *vor sich stehend haben* [to have something standing before oneself].

From this elucidation of reflection, "construction," which is the second moment in the grasping of the Absolute by reason, can be understood.

2. *The Absolute must be "constructed" for consciousness.* This construction is also called "production." Let us carefully examine these two terms.

When Marx says, "Man produces himself, etc. . . . " that means: "Man is a factory. He manufactures himself as he manufactures his shoes." But what does "production" mean for Hegel? Not that man manufactures the Absolute. Production is the form in which reflection is accomplished. "In letting appear, the Absolute is led before consciousness, it is produced."⁴² It is not a question of manufacturing, but of "letting appear."

Construction, for its part, relates to architecture. This reason, representing the Absolute (in the sense of producing it), is a reason which constructs (in the architectonic sense).⁴³ This thought goes back to Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B358):⁴⁴ "Reason is knowledge from principles, is architectonic by nature. That is to say, it treats all knowledge as belonging to a possible system."⁴⁵

To sum up: Reason *reflektiert* [reflects] the Absolute. "This reflecting is a self-bringing forth, a pro-duction. This pro-duction is a construction in which to construct means: to build together (to place together) as belonging together that which belongs together in the self-manifestation of the Absolute."⁴⁶ (On systemics, again see Kant: A645, B673.)

3. *Final moment: "Contraction."* This is now very easy to understand. *Cum-trahere* = *zusammen-ziehen* [to draw together]. Contraction is the *Zusammenziehen* [drawing together] of all the opposites into the highest unity of the Absolute.

Through these successive definitions the *Reflexion der Vernunft* [reflection of reason] which is the subject of page 17 now proves to be clarified. We reread the first line of the paragraph entitled *Reflexion als Instrument des Philosophierens* ["Reflection as the Instrument of Philosophizing"], up to, "thus this is a contradiction,"⁴⁷ stressing these last words. Reason contradicts itself; it forbids to itself what it itself wants. The origin of this "contradiction" is that "every producing has the character of *thesis* (positing), of *synthesis* (composing); thus the whole activity of reason is, as positing, subject to limitation."⁴⁸ This is why Hegel says advisedly, "The Absolute *must* be reflected."⁴⁹

It is necessary to bring out this contradiction without which the Absolute would not be "posited" but suppressed.⁵⁰ In this passage on page 17, *aufheben* does not have the positive meaning which we recognized it to have just now, when it was a matter of the characteristic feature of the Hegelian dialectic. Here *aufgehoben* means, if not that the Absolute is "suppressed," then at least that access to it is not sanctioned.

The end of the sentence attracts particular attention through the

introduction of *das Bewusstlose* [the unconscious]. The unconscious makes one think at once of Freud. But the difference is extreme, and not only because of the fact that Freud says *das Unbewusste*, and not *das Bewusstlose*. The difference is that the Freudian *Unbewusst* [unconscious] does not fall *im Bewusstsein* [within consciousness], while in Hegel the difference between the *Bewusst* [conscious] and the *Bewusstlos* [unconscious] does fall within the *Bewusstsein*: ". . . the Absolute constructed in consciousness as conscious and unconscious" ⁵¹ If the characteristic feature of modern consciousness is *setzen* [positing], then it is necessary to understand that "as conscious" means in this sentence: *als gesetztes* [as posited], and consequently *als bewusstloses* means "not yet posited, not yet raised up." ⁵² In a general way, the language of Hegel is always to be understood as speculative language and not as "ordinary" language.

What is a speculative sentence? Wherein lies its difference from an ordinary sentence? Heidegger now takes as an example the sentence: *Deus est ipsum esse: Gott ist das Sein selbst* [God is Being itself]. This is an *ordinary* metaphysical sentence, not a speculative one (contrary to what the "loftiness" of its theme might make us believe). I arrive at the speculative sentence when the predicate of this sentence (*Sein*) is made subject, becomes subject. Thus: *das Sein ist Gott* [Being is God]. But here it is not a question of a simple reversal of the grammatical structure of the ordinary sentence. Something has changed. What has changed is the meaning of *ist* [is]. A simple reversal would mean "Being is God" as the simple reversal of "the rose is a plant" gives "The plant is a rose." But it is not merely a question of *Umkehrung* [reversal]; it is a question of a counterthrust, a counterthrust carried out by the first *ist* on the second *ist*. *Das Sein ist Gott* now understood speculatively means: *das Sein "istet" Gott, d. h., das Sein lässt Gott Gott sein*. ["Being 'ises' God, i.e., Being lets God be God."] *Ist* is transitive and active. It is only *Being* as unfolded (in the sense that it is in the *Logic*) which (in a speculative rebound) makes being-God possible.

With the silence which the wind of speculation creates, the session ends, everyone happy and refreshed.

APPENDIX 1

The following is my translation of the passage referred to in the seminar as "page 16" of the *Differenzschrift*. The German text itself which follows the translation has been modernized in spelling. The text is taken from Hegel's *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. I, Stuttgart, Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1941, pp. 48–49. (Tr.)

In the conflict of the understanding with reason, strength comes to the former only to the extent that the latter renounces itself. For this reason the success of the conflict depends on reason itself and on the genuineness of the need for reinstating the totality out of which it proceeds.

The need of philosophy *can* be expressed as its *presupposition* if philosophy—which begins with itself—can comprise a sort of antechamber; and there has been much talk in our time of an absolute presupposition. That which we call the presupposition of philosophy is nothing else than the articulated need. Because the need is posited by this means for reflection, there must be two presuppositions.

The one is the Absolute itself; this is the goal which is sought. It is already present; how can it be sought after? Reason produces it only in that it frees consciousness from its limitations. This lifting of the limitations is conditioned by the presupposed limitlessness.

The other presupposition would be consciousness having proceeded out of the totality, the severing into Being and Non-Being, into concept and Being, into finitude and infinitude. From the standpoint of the severing, the absolute synthesis is a beyond—is the undetermined and unformed of its opposed determinations. The Absolute is the night and the light which is newer than the night, and is the difference between them, like the projecting of the light out of the night; an absolute difference;—Nothingness being the first, out of which all Being, all multiplicity of the finite, has proceeded. The task of philosophy, however, consists in uniting these presuppositions, in positing Being in Non-Being—as Becoming; in positing severing in the Absolute—as its appearance; in positing the finite in the infinite—as life.

It is awkward, however, to speak of the need of philosophy as the presupposition of philosophy; for hereby the need takes the form of reflection. This form of reflection appears as the contradictory principles which are to be discussed below. It can be required of principles that they justify themselves; the justification of these principles as presuppositions must not yet be philosophy itself, and thus the investigation and confirmation begin before and outside philosophy.

* * *

Im Kampfe des Verstandes mit der Vernunft kommt jenem eine Stärke nur insoweit zu, als diese auf sich selbst Verzicht tut. Das Gelingen des Kampfs hängt deswegen von ihr selbst ab, und von der Echtheit des Bedürfnisses nach Wiederherstellung der Totalität, aus welchem sie hervorgeht.

Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie kann als ihre Voraussetzung ausgedrückt werden, wenn der Philosophie, die mit sich selbst anfängt, eine Art von Vorhof gemacht werden soll; und es ist in unsern Zeiten viel von einer absoluten Voraussetzung gesprochen worden. Das, was man Voraussetzung der Philosophie nennt, ist nichts Anderes, als das ausgesprochene Bedürfnis. Weil das Bedürfnis hierdurch für die Reflexion gesetzt ist, so muss es zwei Voraussetzungen geben.

Die eine ist das Absolute selbst; es ist das Ziel, das gesucht wird. Es ist schon vorhanden,—wie könnte es sonst gesucht werden? Die Vernunft produziert es nur, indem sie das Bewusstsein von den Beschränkungen befreit; dies Aufheben der Beschränkungen ist bedingt durch die vorausgesetzte Unbeschränktheit.

Die andere Voraussetzung würde das Herausgetretensein des Bewusstseins aus der Totalität sein, die Entzweiung in Sein und Nicht-Sein, in Begriff und Sein, in Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit. Für den Standpunkt der Entzweiung ist die absolute Synthese ein Jenseits,—das ihren Bestimmtheiten entgegengesetzte Unbestimmte und Gestaltlose. Das Absolute ist die Nacht, und das Licht jünger als sie, und der Unterschied beider, so wie das Heraustreten des Lichts aus der Nacht, eine absolute Differenz;—das Nichts das Erste, woraus alles Sein, alle Mannigfaltigkeit des Endlichen hervorgegangen ist. Die Aufgabe der Philosophie besteht aber darin, diese Voraussetzungen zu vereinen, das Sein in das Nichtsein,—als Werden; die Entzweiung in das Absolute, —als dessen Erscheinung; das Endliche in das Unendliche, —als Leben zu setzen.

Es ist aber ungeschickt, das Bedürfnis der Philosophie als eine Voraussetzung derselben auszudrücken; denn hierdurch erhält das Bedürfnis eine Form der Reflexion. Diese Form der Reflexion erscheint als widersprechende Sätze, wovon unten die Rede sein wird. Es kann an Sätze gefordert werden, dass sie sich rechtfertigen; die Rechtfertigung dieser Sätze, als Voraussetzungen, soll noch nicht die Philosophie selbst sein, und so geht das Ergründen und Begründen vor und ausser der Philosophie los.

APPENDIX 2

The passage referred to as "page 17" of the *Differenzschrift* is reproduced below, preceded by my translation of it. The text is taken from Hegel's *Sämtliche Werke, op. cit.*, p. 50. (Tr.)

Reflection as Instrument of Philosophizing

The form that the need of philosophy would receive were it to be articulated as the presupposition provides the transition from the need of philosophy to the instrument of philosophizing, to reflection as reason. The Absolute must be constructed for consciousness; this is the task of philosophy. But because the production as well as the products of reflection are only limitations, this is a contradiction. The Absolute must be reflected, must be posited; however, thereby, it is not posited but suppressed; for to the extent that it was posited it was limited. The mediation of this contradiction is philosophical reflection. It must be shown above all to what extent reflection is capable of grasping the Absolute; and it must be shown to what extent reflection, in its calling as speculation carrying necessity and possibility, is capable of being synthesized with the absolute world view and of being subjectively for itself just as complete as its product the Absolute must be, which is constructed in consciousness simultaneously as conscious and as unconscious.

Isolated reflection, as the positing of oppositions, would be a suppression of the Absolute; it is the power of Being and of limitation. But reflection has, as reason, a relation to the Absolute, and it is reason only through this relation. To that extent reflection annihilates itself and all Being and all things limited, in that it relates them to the Absolute. However, at the same time, precisely through its relation to the Absolute, the limited has a standing.

* * *

Reflexion als Instrument des Philosophierens

Die Form, die das Bedürfnis der Philosophie erhalten würde, wenn es als Voraussetzung ausgesprochen werden sollte, gibt den Übergang vom Bedürfnisse der Philosophie, zum Instrument des Philosophierens, der Reflexion als Vernunft. Das Absolute soll fürs Bewusstsein konstruiert werden, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie; da aber das Produzieren, so wie die Produkte der Reflexion nur Beschränkungen sind, so ist dies ein Widerspruch. Das Absolute soll reflektiert, gesetzt werden: damit ist es aber nicht gesetzt, sondern aufgehoben worden; denn indem es gesetzt wurde, wurde es beschränkt. Die Vermittlung dieses Widerspruchs ist die philosophische Reflexion. Es ist vornehmlich zu zeigen, inwiefern die Reflexion das Absolute zu fassen fähig ist; und in ihrem Geschäft, als Spekulation, die Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit trägt, mit der absoluten Anschauung sythesiert, und für sich, subjektiv, ebenso vollständig zu sein, als es ihr Produkt, das im Bewusstsein konstruierte Absolute, als Bewusstes und Bewusstloses zugleich, sein muss.

Die isolierte Reflexion, als Setzen Entgegengesetzter, wäre ein Aufheben des Absoluten; sie ist das Vermögen des Seins und der Beschränkung. Aber die Reflexion hat, als Vernunft Beziehung auf das Absolute, und sie ist nur Vernunft durch diese Beziehung; die Reflexion vernichtet insofern sich selbst und alles Sein und Beschränkte, indem sie es aufs Absolute bezieht. Zugleich aber eben durch seine Beziehung auf das Absolute hat das Beschränkte ein Bestehen.

NOTES

1. The *Differenzschrift* (*Writing on Difference*), one of Hegel's earliest works (published in 1801) is the text for this seminar. Its full title is: *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie in Beziehung auf Reinholds Beiträge zur Leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie zu Anfang des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Erstes Heft* (The Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling in Relation to Reinhold's Contributions to A Freer View of the Situation of Philosophy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century, Part I). The text used by the translator is found in Volume I of Hegel's *Sämtliche Werke* (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag), 1941, pp. 41--168.

2. The translations of German terms and phrases that have been inserted into the text by the translator are enclosed in brackets. When German words appear in brackets they have been taken from Curd Ochwad's translation of the Seminar transcript in Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfort: Klostermann, 1977), pp. 24--63. Where the translation of the German is enclosed in parentheses a comparable French translation of the German term or phrase occurs in the original text.

3. The French transcriber uses the archaic spelling, *Geheimniss*. Here and throughout the *Seminar* the translator has modernized the spelling, including Hegel's own as the students encounter it in the *Differenzschrift* itself. E.g., *Sein* (for *Seyn*), *Bedürfnis* (for *Bedürfniss*), *produzieren* (for *produciren*).

4. The book referred to is the one whose title appears in Hegel's own long title: *Beiträge zur . . .*

5. Heidegger quotes this same note in the form in which it was actually printed, "Better a mended sock than a torn sock," in *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 74.

6. The full text in the *Differenzschrift* runs (Hegel, *Werke*, pp. 45--46): "The oppositions which previously were important in the form of spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and understanding, freedom and necessity, etc., and under many other modes in still more restricted spheres, and which attached to themselves all the weight of human interest, have with the progress of civilization passed over into the form of the opposites of reason and sensuality, intelligence and nature, or, for the universal concept, into the form of the opposites of absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity." (*Die Gegensätze, die sonst unter der Form von Geist und Materie, Seele und Leib, Glauben und Verstand, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit u. s. w., und in eingeschränktern Sphären noch in mancherlei Arten bedeutend waren, und alle Gewichte menschlicher Interessen an sich anhenkten, sind im Fortgang der Bildung in die Form der Gegensätze von Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit, Intelligenz und Natur, für den allgemeinen Begriff, von absoluter Subjektivität und absoluter Objektivität übergegangen.*)

7. *In der Zerrissenheit waltet immer Einheit, oder notwendige Vereinigung, d. h., lebendige Einheit.*

8. The sentence in full reads: (Hegel, *Werke*, p. 46) When the power of union disappears from the life of men, and the opposites, having lost their living relationship and their reciprocal action, have won autonomy, the need of philosophy arises. (*Wenn die Macht der Vereinigung aus dem Leben der Menschen verschwindet, und die Gegensätze ihre lebendige Beziehung und Wechselwirkung verloren haben, und Selbstständigkeit gewinnen, entsteht das Bedürfnis der Philosophie.*)

9. Here *Selbstbewusstsein* is not intended to have the philosophical meaning of self-consciousness, but the ordinary meaning that it carries in language: self-conceit or arrogance. *Anders denkt die alltägliche Erfahrung* ("Everyday experience thinks otherwise"), Heidegger said. —Transcriber's note.

10. Hegel, *Werke*, p. 13. The full German text has already been given in note 6.

11. See the full quote in note 8.

12. P. 12, top. . . . *die notwendige Entzweiung ist ein Faktor des Lebens, das ewig entgegengesetzt sich bildet, und die Totalität ist in der höchsten Lebendigkeit nur durch Wiederherstellung aus der höchsten Trennung möglich.*

13. Heidegger would translate *pollachos legomenon* approximately as "manifoldness of the ways of coming into appearance." See the last sentence in Heidegger's *Was Ist Das – Die Philosophie?* (Pfullingen: Neske), 1955, p. 46: *To on legetai pollachos* (*Das seiend-Sein kommt vielfältig zum Scheinen* ["Being-in-being comes into appearance in manifold ways"]).

14. This summary was written September 2.—Transcriber's note.

15. *Die Philosophie als eine durch Reflexion produzierte Totalität des Wissens wird ein System, ein organisches Ganzes von Begriffen, dessen höchstes Gesetz nicht der Verstand, sondern die Vernunft ist.*

16. In the original transcript this passage from the *Critique of Pure Reason* is quoted in French only. The English translation from the German which appears here is that of Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1925), pp. 513–14. Curd Ochwad, in his German translation of the transcript, quotes directly from Kant's *Kritik: Die unbedingte Notwendigkeit, die wir, als den letzten Träger aller Dinge so unentbehrlich bedürfen, ist der wahre Abgrund für die menschliche Vernunft. Selbst die Ewigkeit, so schauderhaft erhaben sie auch ein Haller schildern mag, macht lange den schwindligen Eindruck nicht auf das Gemüt; denn sie misst nur die Dauer der Dinge, aber trägt sie nicht. Man kann sich des Gedanken nicht erwehren, man kann ihn aber auch nicht ertragen: dass ein Wesen, welches wir uns auch als das höchste unter allen möglichen vorstellen, gleichsam zu sich selbst sage: Ich bin von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit, ausser mir ist nichts, ohne das, was bloss durch meinen Willen etwas ist; aber woher bin ich denn? Hier sinkt alles unter uns, und die grösste Vollkommenheit, wie die kleinste, schwebt ohne Haltung bloss vor der spekulativen Vernunft, der es nichts kostet, die eine so wie die andere ohne die mindeste Hindernis verschwinden zu lassen* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft, bes. von Raymund Schmidt, Neudruck Hamburg 1956* (Philos. Bibl. Bd. 37a), S. 582–583). See *Vier Seminare*, pp. 36–37.

17. *Die Form, die das Bedürfnis der Philosophie erhalten würde, wenn es als Voraussetzung ausgesprochen werden sollte gibt den Übergang vom Bedürfnisse der Philosophie zum Instrument des Philosophierens, der Reflexion als Vernunft.* See Appendix 2 for the full text of "page 17" and an accompanying translation.

18. See note 8 above for the full passage.

19. *Das Sein ist keine Abstraktion von "ist," sondern "ist" kann ich nur sagen in der Offenbarkeit des Seins.*

20. *Im Kampfe des Verstandes mit der Vernunft kommt jenem eine Stärke nur insoweit zu, als diese auf sich selbst Verzicht tut.* See the full text and accompanying translation of "page 16" in Appendix 1.

21. *Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie kann als ihre Voraussetzung ausgedrückt werden, wenn der Philosophie, die mit sich selbst anfängt, eine Art von Vorhof gemacht werden soll.* The underlining here is in the summary of the seminar session only. Consult Appendix 1.

22. *Das, was man Voraussetzung der Philosophie nennt, ist nichts Anderes, als das ausgesprochene Bedürfnis.* The underlining is that of the transcriber.

23. *Die Aufgabe der Philosophie besteht aber darin . . .* See Appendix 2 for the full text and translation.

24. *Es ist aber ungeschickt . . .* See Appendix 2 for the full text and translation.

25. *Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie kann sich darin befriedigen, zum Prinzip der Vernichtung aller fixierten Entgegensetzungen und zu der Beziehung des Beschränkten auf das Absolute durchgedrungen zu sein.*

26. The German translation has: *Die Schwierigkeit bleibt nur den Bezug von Seiendem und Sein zu bestimmen* (The difficulty remains only to define the relation of what-is to Being).

27. *Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie kann sich darin befriedigen . . . durchgedrungen zu sein.* For the passage in its entirety see above note 25.

28. *Das Absolute soll reflektiert, gesetzt werden.* See Appendix 2 for the complete text of "page 17."

29. Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., p. 155.

30. When a passage is in quotes, it may be assumed that the transcriber is quoting Heidegger unless reference is made to another.

31. "The fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is motion—" (McKeon tr.)

32. *Am reinsten gibt sich die weder synthetisch noch analytisch zu nennende Methode des Systems, wenn sie als eine Entwicklung der Vernunft selbst erscheint, welche die Emanation ihrer Erscheinung als eine Duplizität nicht in sich immer wieder zurückruft—hiemit vernichtete sie dieselbe nur—, sondern sich in ihr zu einer durch jene Duplizität bedingte Identität konstruiert, diese relative Identität wieder sich entgegensetzt, so dass das System bis zur vollendeten objektiven Totalität forteht, sie mit der entgegenstehenden subjectiven zur unendlichen Weltanschauung vereinigt, deren Expansion sich damit zugleich in die reichste und einfachste Identität kontrahiert hat.*

33. *Ich musste also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen.*

34. *Das Absolute soll reflektiert . . . werden.*

35. *Es sich selbst zur Erscheinung bringt.*

36. *Diese Art von "Spiegeln" berechtigt dass das Erfassen der Vernunft "spekulativ" ist.*

37. *Auffängt, und nicht empfängt.*

38. *Eine Sache von sich her, wie sie ist, d.h., anwest, stehen lassen.*

39. "Reach" is the translation of the French *portée*, which also might be rendered as "scope."

40. *Phenomenologische Übung ist mehr wichtig als Hegellesung.*

41. *Das Absolute soll für den Menschen—das Bewusstsein—erscheinen.*

42. *Im Erscheinen lassen wird das Absolute dem Bewusstsein vor-geführt, her-gestellt, = produced.*

43. *Diese vorstellende Vernunft des Absoluten (im Sinne des Vorführens) ist eine konstruierende Vernunft (im Sinne der Architektur).*

44. This citation seems to be incorrect. Very nearly the same words do appear, however, in A 474, B 502 of the *Critique*.

45. *Vernunft ist Erkenntnis aus Prinzipien, ist, ihrer Natur nach architektonisch. Das heisst: Sie betrachtet alle Erkenntnisse als gehörig zu einem möglichen System.*

46. *Dieses Reflektieren ist eine Konstruktion, wobei Konstruieren heisst: Zusammengehörige im Sich-zeigen des Absoluten als zusammengehörig zusammenbauen (zusammenstellen).*

47. *So ist dies ein Widerspruch.*

48. *Jedes Produzieren hat den Charakter der thesis, der synthesis, so ist die ganze Tätigkeit der Vernunft "tätig," setzende, etwas Beschränktes.*

49. *Das Absolute soll reflektiert . . . werden.* The italics are the transcriber's, who adds: *Sollen* indicates here "the task of philosophy." Hegel says: "The Absolute must be constructed for consciousness; such is the task of philosophy; but as the activity which produces reflection and its products are only limitations, there is a contradiction here."

50. *Nicht "gesetzt," sondern aufgehoben.*

51. . . . *das im Bewusstsein konstruierte Absolute als bewusstes und bewusstloses . . .* (Italics by the transcriber.)

52. *Noch nicht gesetzt, noch nicht aufgehoben.*